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My​ ​research​ ​explores​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​government 
policies​ ​are​ ​changing.​ ​I​ ​review​ ​literature​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​history​ ​and​ ​political​ ​involvement, 
and​ ​I​ ​develop​ ​a​ ​“spectrum”​ ​model​ ​to​ ​locate​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​views​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​over​ ​the 
last​ ​decade.​ ​I​ ​cite​ ​opinion​ ​poll​ ​data​ ​and​ ​testimonials​ ​to​ ​hypothesize​ ​that​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​are​ ​shifting​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​model.​ ​I​ ​further​ ​hypothesize​ ​the 
conditions​ ​under​ ​which​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​views​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​shift,​ ​and​ ​in​ ​what​ ​direction​ ​we 
can​ ​expect​ ​views​ ​to​ ​shift​ ​when​ ​those​ ​conditions​ ​are​ ​met.​ ​I​ ​outline​ ​methods​ ​for​ ​testing​ ​my 
hypotheses,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​conclude​ ​by​ ​analyzing​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​correct​ ​hypotheses​ ​and​ ​by 
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III.​ ​Introduction:​ ​​Hutz​ ​La’aretz​,​ ​“Outside​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Land” 
A. Motivations​ ​and​ ​Overview 
The​ ​Hebrew​ ​word​ ​​ha’aretz​,​ ​literally​ ​“the​ ​land,”​ ​migrated​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​lexicon​ ​to 
Zionist ​ ​politics​ ​in​ ​the​ ​late​ ​19​th​​ ​century,​ ​about​ ​sixty​ ​years​ ​before​ ​the​ ​founding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​state​ ​of 1
Israel.​ ​Early​ ​Zionist​ ​thinkers​ ​used​ ​​ha’aretz​​ ​as​ ​a​ ​means​ ​of​ ​describing​ ​the​ ​“Jewish​ ​homeland” 
central​ ​to​ ​their​ ​ideology.​ ​​Ha’aretz​​ ​became​ ​as​ ​a​ ​stand-in​ ​term​ ​for​ ​the​ ​land​ ​that​ ​would​ ​become​ ​the 
state​ ​of​ ​Israel,​ ​tying​ ​biblical​ ​prophecies​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Jewish​ ​homeland​ ​to​ ​the​ ​physical​ ​land​ ​of​ ​biblical 
Israel .​ ​This​ ​usage​ ​of​ ​​ha’aretz​​ ​captured​ ​two​ ​central​ ​components​ ​of​ ​Zionism:​ ​the​ ​unity​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​as 2
physical​ ​land,​ ​cultural​ ​cradle,​ ​and​ ​sacred​ ​site​ ​for​ ​Jewish​ ​people,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​positioning​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​as 
the​ ​center​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​world.   3
The​ ​Zionist​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​–​ ​as​ ​both​ ​unifying​ ​and​ ​central​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​life​ ​–​ ​and​ ​the 
widespread​ ​acceptance​ ​of​ ​Zionism​ ​by​ ​Jews​ ​around​ ​the​ ​world,​ ​​ ​have​ ​produced​ ​a​ ​range​ ​of​ ​complex 
political​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​within​ ​modern​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​communities. ​ ​Zionism 4
coalesced​ ​and​ ​gained​ ​political​ ​traction​ ​primarily​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​European​ ​anti-Semitism, ​ ​a​ ​force 5
functionally​ ​distinct​ ​from​ ​American​ ​histories​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​persecution. ​ ​Early​ ​Zionists​ ​argued 6
forcefully​ ​that​ ​centuries​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​persecution​ ​in​ ​Christian​ ​Europe​ ​proved​ ​that​ ​there​ ​was​ ​no 
1 ​ ​See​ ​“Zionism”​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​III​ ​Part​ ​B.​ ​Terminology. 
2 ​ ​See​ ​“Israel/Palestine”​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​III​ ​Part​ ​B.​ ​Terminology. 
3 ​ ​Schlomo​ ​45 
4 ​ ​See​ ​“Jewish​ ​Diaspora”​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​III​ ​Part​ ​B.​ ​Terminology. 
5 ​ ​A​ ​number​ ​of​ ​factors​ ​birthed​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​movement,​ ​including​ ​European​ ​Jewish​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​the 
Enlightenment,​ ​assimilation​ ​dynamics,​ ​Biblical,​ ​cultural,​ ​and​ ​historical​ ​precedents​ ​for​ ​an​ ​“ingathering​ ​of 
exiles”​ ​in​ ​Israel,​ ​and​ ​persecution​ ​of​ ​Jews​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Diaspora.​ ​The​ ​argument​ ​made​ ​here​ ​is​ ​not​ ​intended​ ​to 
negate​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​other​ ​influences,​ ​but​ ​rather​ ​stress​ ​the​ ​significance​ ​of​ ​anti-Semitism​ ​as​ ​an 
essential​ ​rallying​ ​cry​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​movement.​ ​See​ ​Section​ ​IV​ ​Part​ ​C.​ ​for​ ​a​ ​history​ ​of​ ​Zionism​ ​and​ ​a 
discussion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​factors​ ​that​ ​enabled​ ​its​ ​successes.  
6 ​ ​Cohen​ ​567 
6 
possibility​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​longevity​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Diaspora,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Jewish​ ​national 
home​ ​was​ ​critical​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​survival. ​ ​Jews​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Diaspora,​ ​Zionists​ ​believed,​ ​awaited​ ​either 7
discrimination,​ ​persecution,​ ​and​ ​death,​ ​assimilation​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​death,​ ​or​ ​both.​ ​The​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​the 
inevitability​ ​of​ ​Diaspora​ ​anti-Semitism​ ​generated​ ​widespread​ ​adoption​ ​of​ ​an​ ​attitude​ ​of​ ​​shlilat 
ha’galut​, ​ ​or​ ​negation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Diaspora,​ ​among​ ​Zionists.​ ​​Ha’aretz​,​ ​the​ ​land,​ ​entered​ ​Zionist 8
rhetoric​ ​as​ ​a​ ​reflection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​movement’s​ ​fundamental​ ​pessimism​ ​towards​ ​Diaspora​ ​Jewishness. 
Israel​ ​was​ ​“the​ ​land,”​ ​and​ ​the​ ​only​ ​land.​ ​Zionists​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​the​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​a​ ​national 
homeland​ ​there​ ​was​ ​Jews’​ ​only​ ​hope​ ​for​ ​survival.​ ​Jews​ ​​hutz​ ​la’aretz​, ​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​the​ ​land,​ ​were 9
doomed.   10
The​ ​social,​ ​economic,​ ​and​ ​political​ ​success​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​communities,​ ​coupled 
with​ ​American​ ​Jews’​ ​failure​ ​to​ ​emigrate​ ​to​ ​Israel​ ​en​ ​masse​ ​after​ ​its​ ​founding​ ​in​ ​1948,​ ​poses​ ​an 
ideological​ ​challenge​ ​to​ ​Zionism​ ​and​ ​complicates​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​its 
politics.​ ​The​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​Diaspora​ ​is​ ​arguably​ ​the​ ​most​ ​prosperous​ ​Jewish​ ​community​ ​​hutz 
la’aretz​​ ​since​ ​the​ ​first​ ​Israelite​ ​kingdom​ ​was​ ​exiled​ ​to​ ​Babylon​ ​in​ ​598​ ​B.C.E. ​ ​Its​ ​continued 11
existence​ ​and​ ​historically​ ​unprecedented​ ​prosperity​ ​seemingly​ ​undermine​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​argument 
for​ ​the​ ​necessity​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Jewish​ ​state​ ​and​ ​have​ ​produced​ ​political​ ​tension​ ​between​ ​American​ ​Jews 
and​ ​their​ ​Israeli​ ​counterparts.​ ​Some​ ​Israeli​ ​and​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​argued​ ​forcefully​ ​for​ ​strong 
partnerships​ ​between​ ​their​ ​communities​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​strengthen​ ​Israel​ ​financially​ ​and​ ​politically; 
others​ ​have​ ​rejected​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​interference​ ​in​ ​Israeli​ ​politics,​ ​citing​ ​the​ ​irrelevance​ ​of 
Israel​ ​to​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​life​ ​or​ ​the​ ​perceived​ ​inability​ ​or​ ​unwillingness​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​to 
7 ​ ​Diner​ ​7 
8 ​ ​See​ ​​shlilat​ ​ha'​galut​​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​III​ ​Part​ ​B.​ ​Terminology. 
9 ​ ​See​ ​​hutz​ ​la’aretz​ ​​in​ ​Section​ ​III​ ​Part​ ​B.​ ​Terminology. 
10 ​ ​Gartner​ ​264 
11 ​ ​Halperin​ ​90 
7 
understand​ ​Israeli​ ​political​ ​nuance.​ ​A​ ​minority​ ​of​ ​Jews,​ ​Israeli​ ​and​ ​American,​ ​have​ ​called​ ​on 
American​ ​Jews​ ​to​ ​denounce​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions,​ ​usually​ ​citing​ ​these 
policies’​ ​inconsistency​ ​with​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​values​ ​or​ ​Jewish​ ​religious​ ​teachings.   12
The​ ​final​ ​layer​ ​of​ ​the​ ​conflicting​ ​ideologies​ ​that​ ​shape​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on 
Israel​ ​is​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​impact​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​Many​ ​Zionists,​ ​both​ ​within​ ​Israel​ ​and 
abroad,​ ​export​ ​a​ ​framework​ ​for​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​that​ ​centers​ ​Israel​ ​as​ ​essential​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​political 
and/or​ ​spiritual​ ​existence,​ ​and​ ​defines​ ​Jewish​ ​people​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​their​ ​collective​ ​“longing​ ​to 
return”​ ​to​ ​Israel.​ ​This​ ​framework​ ​draws​ ​on​ ​the​ ​influence​ ​of​ ​​Eretz​ ​Yisrael​​ ​on​ ​centuries​ ​of​ ​Jewish 
identity​ ​and​ ​practice;​ ​Jewish​ ​daily​ ​prayers,​ ​sometimes​ ​recited​ ​while​ ​facing​ ​Jerusalem,​ ​refer​ ​to 
“your​ ​people​ ​Israel,”​ ​“your​ ​return​ ​to​ ​Jerusalem,”​ ​and,​ ​on​ ​some​ ​holy​ ​days,​ ​conclude​ ​with​ ​cries​ ​of 
“Next​ ​year​ ​in​ ​Jerusalem!”​ ​Jewish​ ​religious​ ​texts,​ ​laws,​ ​and​ ​customs​ ​associate​ ​​aliyah​,​ ​or​ ​Jewish 
immigration​ ​to​ ​Israel,​ ​with​ ​salvation,​ ​and​ ​some​ ​rabbis​ ​contend​ ​that​ ​“return”​ ​to​ ​Israel​ ​is​ ​a 
religious​ ​obligation​ ​for​ ​Jewish​ ​people.​ ​Prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​emergence​ ​of​ ​Zionist​ ​movement,​ ​most 
Diaspora​ ​Jews​ ​understood​ ​religious​ ​reverence​ ​of​ ​​Eretz​ ​Yisrael​​ ​as​ ​spiritual,​ ​not​ ​temporal.​ ​The 
commandment​ ​to​ ​“return”​ ​was​ ​usually​ ​interpreted​ ​as​ ​a​ ​call​ ​to​ ​a​ ​spiritual​ ​homecoming​ ​during​ ​a 
future​ ​messianic​ ​age,​ ​not​ ​a​ ​literal​ ​imperative​ ​to​ ​immigrate.​ ​While​ ​some​ ​Jews​ ​did​ ​engage​ ​literally 
with​ ​​aliyah​​ ​and​ ​immigrated​ ​to​ ​Israel​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​birth​ ​of​ ​Zionism,​ ​most​ ​did​ ​not​ ​associate​ ​the 
teachings​ ​and​ ​customs​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​practice​ ​with​ ​the​ ​political​ ​goals​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​movement​ ​prior 
to​ ​its​ ​emergence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​late​ ​nineteenth​ ​century.   13
Zionists’​ ​assertion​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​as​ ​a​ ​European-style​ ​nationality​ ​have​ ​relied​ ​on 
Jewish​ ​histories,​ ​traditions,​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​tie​ ​Jewish​ ​people​ ​to​ ​Israel.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Zionist 
12 ​ ​Kimmerling​ ​3 
13 ​ ​Lipka​ ​4 
8 
ideology,​ ​Jewish​ ​identity,​ ​through​ ​its​ ​traditional​ ​roots​ ​in​ ​shared​ ​history,​ ​culture,​ ​and​ ​practice,​ ​is 
inherently​ ​linked​ ​to​ ​Israel. ​ ​This​ ​articulation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​has​ ​sometimes​ ​been​ ​interpreted 14
as​ ​a​ ​radical​ ​departure​ ​from​ ​how​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​understand​ ​themselves.​ ​In​ ​1885,​ ​for​ ​example, 
the​ ​American​ ​Reform​ ​Movement​ ​issued​ ​the​ ​Pittsburgh​ ​Platform​ ​rejecting​ ​Zionism​ ​on​ ​the 
grounds​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​irrelevant​ ​to​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​identity:​ ​"We​ ​consider​ ​ourselves​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​a 
nation​ ​but​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​community,​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​expect​ ​neither​ ​a​ ​return​ ​to​ ​Palestine,​ ​nor​ ​a 
sacrificial​ ​worship​ ​under​ ​the​ ​administration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​sons​ ​of​ ​Aaron,​ ​nor​ ​the​ ​restoration​ ​of​ ​any​ ​of 
the​ ​laws​ ​concerning​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​state." 
After​ ​the​ ​Holocaust,​ ​many​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​grew​ ​more​ ​sympathetic​ ​to​ ​Zionism.​ ​Most 
communities​ ​tried​ ​to​ ​mitigate​ ​the​ ​tension​ ​produced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​embrace​ ​of​ ​Zionist​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​in 
the​ ​Diaspora​ ​by​ ​supporting​ ​Israel​ ​politically​ ​and​ ​financially,​ ​even​ ​while​ ​refusing,​ ​for​ ​the​ ​most 
part,​ ​to​ ​make​ ​​aliyah​.​ ​Political​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​Israel​ ​became​ ​a​ ​means​ ​of​ ​reconciling​ ​the​ ​tension 
produced​ ​by​ ​embracing​ ​Diaspora​ ​Jewishness​ ​in​ ​a​ ​Jewish​ ​world​ ​saturated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​success​ ​of​ ​the 
Zionist​ ​movement. ​ ​Even​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​who​ ​celebrate​ ​life​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Diaspora​ ​are​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to 15
hold​ ​political​ ​views​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​than​ ​are​ ​their​ ​non-Jewish​ ​counterparts.​ ​As​ ​with​ ​all​ ​groups​ ​of 
Americans,​ ​not​ ​all​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​engage​ ​with​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​any​ ​kind.​ ​However,​ ​for​ ​those​ ​who​ ​do, 
Israel​ ​is​ ​almost​ ​always​ ​a​ ​key​ ​issue.   16
This​ ​thesis​ ​aims​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and 
government​ ​actions​ ​and​ ​generate​ ​hypotheses​ ​to​ ​test​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​those​ ​perspectives​ ​have 
shifted​ ​between​ ​2007​ ​and​ ​2017.​ ​Critically,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​empirically​ ​test​ ​claims.​ ​Instead,​ ​I​ ​offer 
historical​ ​context​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​psychology,​ ​develop​ ​a​ ​data-driven 
14 ​ ​Kimmerling​ ​16 
15 ​ ​Diner​ ​89 
16 ​ ​Liu​ ​8 
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model​ ​to​ ​locate​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​views​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten​ ​years,​ ​hypothesize 
that​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​perspectives​ ​have​ ​shifted​ ​during​ ​that​ ​time​ ​period,​ ​and​ ​provide 
strategies​ ​that​ ​other​ ​researchers​ ​should​ ​use​ ​to​ ​test​ ​these​ ​hypotheses.  
B.​ ​Terminology 
Throughout​ ​this​ ​thesis,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​use​ ​terms​ ​with​ ​ambiguous​ ​or​ ​contested​ ​definitions.​ ​To​ ​provide 
clarity​ ​to​ ​the​ ​reader,​ ​I​ ​have​ ​provided​ ​working​ ​definitions,​ ​along​ ​with​ ​background​ ​on​ ​how​ ​I 
developed​ ​these​ ​definitions,​ ​below.  
I.​ ​“Jew” 
I​ ​utilize​ ​the​ ​same​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​“Jew”​ ​that​ ​nearly​ ​all​ ​demographic​ ​surveys​ ​use.​ ​Jews​ ​are​ ​people 
who​ ​identify​ ​as​ ​Jewish​ ​culturally,​ ​ethnically,​ ​religiously,​ ​or​ ​some​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​the​ ​three. 
Orthodox​ ​rulings​ ​on​ ​who​ ​“counts”​ ​as​ ​Jewish​ ​are​ ​traditionally​ ​made​ ​by​ ​religious​ ​authorities​ ​and 
only​ ​recognize:​ ​A)​ ​Children​ ​born​ ​to​ ​ethnically​ ​Jewish​ ​mothers;​ ​B)​ ​Religious​ ​converts. 
Functional​ ​definitions​ ​for​ ​non-Orthodox​ ​Jews,​ ​however,​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​a​ ​much​ ​broader​ ​interpretation 
of​ ​Jewishness,​ ​one​ ​that​ ​recognizes​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​of​ ​observance​ ​(or​ ​lack​ ​thereof)​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​and 
ethnic​ ​diversity​ ​within​ ​Jewish​ ​communities.​ ​For​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​this​ ​paper,​ ​I​ ​shall​ ​recognize​ ​as 
Jewish​ ​any​ ​individual​ ​who​ ​sees​ ​him/herself​ ​as​ ​Jewish​ ​culturally,​ ​ethnically,​ ​and/or​ ​religiously.  17
I​ ​will​ ​develop​ ​in​ ​later​ ​sections​ ​that​ ​first-person​ ​perspective​ ​on​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​-​ ​i.e.​ ​seeing 
oneself​ ​as​ ​Jewish​ ​or​ ​not​ ​-​ ​is​ ​a​ ​key​ ​determinant​ ​of​ ​engagement​ ​in​ ​Jewish​ ​communities​ ​and 
political​ ​activism​ ​regarding​ ​Israel. 
II.​ ​“​Eretz​ ​Yisrael”​ ​​vs.​ ​Israel: 
17 ​ ​Liu​ ​8 
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Characterizing​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​modern​ ​Jews​ ​and​ ​Israel​ ​presents​ ​political​ ​as 
well​ ​as​ ​linguistic​ ​challenges.​ ​That​ ​modern​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​long-established​ ​cultural​ ​and​ ​religious​ ​ties 
to​ ​the​ ​“land”​ ​that​ ​is​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​is​ ​certainly​ ​substantiated​ ​by​ ​historical​ ​and 
sociological​ ​data,​ ​as​ ​I​ ​will​ ​establish​ ​in​ ​later​ ​sections.​ ​However,​ ​because​ ​such​ ​claims​ ​are 
sometimes​ ​weaponized​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​other​ ​groups​ ​claim​ ​to​ ​that​ ​same​ ​land,​ ​despite​ ​historical​ ​and 
sociological​ ​data​ ​in​ ​support​ ​of​ ​those​ ​claims,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​critical​ ​to​ ​be​ ​precise​ ​and​ ​intentional​ ​in 
describing​ ​this​ ​relationship.​ ​I​ ​will​ ​therefore​ ​draw​ ​a​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​relationship 
with​ ​Eretz​ ​Yisrael,​ ​the​ ​religious,​ ​mythical,​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​understanding​ ​of​ ​“The​ ​Land​ ​of​ ​Israel,” 
and​ ​the​ ​political​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​Jews​ ​and​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​that​ ​is​ ​(sometimes) 
influenced​ ​by​ ​Jewish​ ​conceptions​ ​of​ ​Eretz​ ​Yisrael. 
Modern​ ​Diaspora​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​traditionally​ ​understood​ ​themselves​ ​as​ ​descendants​ ​of​ ​ancient​ ​Jews, 
some​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​once​ ​concentrated​ ​in​ ​Palestine.​ ​Palestine​ ​holds​ ​religious​ ​significance​ ​for​ ​Jews, 
both​ ​as​ ​the​ ​home​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​holy​ ​sites​ ​and​ ​as​ ​the​ ​region​ ​traditionally​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​biblical 
“Promised​ ​Land.”  18
III.​ ​Diaspora 
The​ ​Jewish​ ​Diaspora​ ​encapsulates​ ​Jews​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​what​ ​is​ ​now​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​the 
Palestinian​ ​territories,​ ​and​ ​includes​ ​American​ ​Jews.  19
IV.​ ​Israel/Palestine 
Israel​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​the​ ​modern​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Israel,​ ​unless​ ​otherwise​ ​specified.​ ​Palestine​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​the 
Palestinian​ ​territories.   20
V.​ ​Zionism 
18 ​ ​Cohen​ ​34 
19 ​ ​Kimmerling​ ​102 
20 ​ ​Laqueur​ ​3 
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Zionism​ ​is​ ​the​ ​political​ ​movement​ ​for​ ​a​ ​Jewish​ ​homeland. 
VI.​ ​​Shilat​ ​Ha’gulat 
Life​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Diaspora​ ​would​ ​either​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​discrimination​ ​and​ ​persecution​ ​or​ ​to​ ​national​ ​decadence 
and​​ ​​assimilation​.​ ​A​ ​more​ ​moderate​ ​formulation​ ​says​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Jews​ ​as​ ​a​ ​people​ ​have​ ​no​ ​future 
without​ ​a​ ​"spiritual​ ​center"​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Land​ ​of​ ​Israel.  21
IV.​ ​Literature​ ​Review:​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​Perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​[NEEDS​ ​CITATION​ ​OVERHAUL] 
A. American​ ​Jewish​ ​History 
I. Immigration 
The​ ​first​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​landed​ ​in​ ​what​ ​is​ ​now​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mid-17th 
century.​ ​They​ ​were​ ​mostly​ ​Western​ ​Sephardic​ ​Jews​ ​from​ ​Spain​ ​and​ ​Portugal.​ ​The​ ​first 
Ashkenazi​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​arrived​ ​in​ ​1720,​ ​coming​ ​from​ ​Central​ ​and​ ​Eastern​ ​Europe,​ ​and 
quickly​ ​swallowed​ ​the​ ​smaller​ ​Sephardic​ ​communities.​ ​However,​ ​Sephardic​ ​Jews​ ​became​ ​active 
in​ ​American​ ​colonial​ ​politics,​ ​especially​ ​after​ ​earning​ ​political​ ​rights​ ​in​ ​colonies​ ​with​ ​heavy 
Jewish​ ​populations​ ​in​ ​the​ ​late​ ​18th​ ​century.   22
American​ ​Jewish​ ​communities​ ​remained​ ​small​ ​until​ ​large-scale​ ​immigration​ ​from​ ​Central 
Europe​ ​in​ ​the​ ​mid-19th​ ​century.​ ​Ashkenazi​ ​Jews​ ​fleeing​ ​anti-Semitic​ ​persecution​ ​in​ ​Europe 
settled​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States​ ​as​ ​merchants​ ​and​ ​shop​ ​owners.​ ​The​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​community​ ​by 
the​ ​late​ ​19th​ ​century​ ​was​ ​about​ ​250,000​ ​strong,​ ​educated,​ ​secular,​ ​and​ ​largely​ ​German.​ ​Its 
demographic​ ​shifted​ ​at​ ​the​ ​turn​ ​of​ ​century​ ​with​ ​a​ ​heavy​ ​influx​ ​of​ ​Yiddish-speaking​ ​Eastern 
European​ ​Ashkenazi​ ​immigrants,​ ​seeking​ ​refuge​ ​from​ ​anti-Jewish​ ​persecution​ ​and​ ​economic 
turmoil​ ​at​ ​in​ ​rural​ ​parts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Russian​ ​Empire​ ​and​ ​what​ ​is​ ​now​ ​Poland,​ ​Ukraine,​ ​Lithuania, 
21 ​ ​Diner​ ​7 
22 ​ ​Cohen​ ​56 
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Moldova,​ ​and​ ​Belarus.​ ​Urban​ ​Ashkenazi​ ​Jews​ ​from​ ​the​ ​Austro-Hungarian​ ​Empire,​ ​driven​ ​out​ ​of 
their​ ​home​ ​countries​ ​by​ ​economic​ ​difficulties,​ ​arrived​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US​ ​in​ ​droves.​ ​Between​ ​1880​ ​and​ ​the 
enforcement​ ​of​ ​Immigration​ ​Act​ ​of​ ​1924,​ ​over​ ​2,000,000​ ​Jews​ ​landed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​United​ ​States.​ ​The 
majority​ ​settled​ ​in​ ​New​ ​York​ ​City,​ ​establishing​ ​the​ ​city​ ​as​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​significant​ ​centers​ ​of 
Jewish​ ​life​ ​and​ ​culture​ ​in​ ​the​ ​world.​ ​In​ ​1915,​ ​500,000​ ​Yiddish​ ​newspapers​ ​circulated​ ​the​ ​New 
York​ ​metropolitan​ ​area​ ​alone,​ ​with​ ​600,000​ ​additional​ ​subscriptions​ ​nationally.​ ​New​ ​Jewish 
immigrants​ ​established​ ​New​ ​York​ ​as​ ​a​ ​hub​ ​of​ ​language,​ ​culture,​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​religious​ ​practice,​ ​a 
tradition​ ​that​ ​continues​ ​today.   23
II.​ ​Assimilation 
Early​ ​20th​ ​century​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​structured​ ​communities​ ​around​ ​small​ ​synagogues 
and​ ​cultural​ ​centers​ ​with​ ​Jews​ ​with​ ​roots​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​regions,​ ​cities,​ ​or​ ​villages​ ​in​ ​Europe​ ​or​ ​the 
Middle​ ​East/North​ ​Africa.​ ​While​ ​much​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​life​ ​in​ ​late​ ​19th​ ​century​ ​Europe​ ​had​ ​been 
characterized​ ​by​ ​its​ ​insulation​ ​from​ ​the​ ​outside​ ​world,​ ​many​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​pushed​ ​their 
communities​ ​to​ ​assimilate​ ​into​ ​American​ ​life.​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​writers​ ​and​ ​artists​ ​played​ ​a​ ​role 
in​ ​shaping​ ​20th​ ​century​ ​American​ ​culture,​ ​inserting​ ​the​ ​wry​ ​pessimism​ ​and​ ​ironic​ ​wit​ ​of 
Ashkenazi​ ​village​ ​culture​ ​into​ ​the​ ​American​ ​mainstream. ​ ​Half​ ​of​ ​all​ ​Jewish​ ​men​ ​between​ ​18 24
and​ ​50​ ​served​ ​in​ ​World​ ​War​ ​II,​ ​and​ ​many​ ​Jewish​ ​families​ ​joined​ ​the​ ​post-war​ ​suburbanization​ ​of 
the​ ​white​ ​American​ ​mainstream.​ ​Suburban​ ​Jews​ ​saw​ ​intermarriage​ ​rates​ ​rise,​ ​a​ ​traditional 
hallmark​ ​of​ ​assimilation,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​shift​ ​from​ ​cities​ ​to​ ​suburbs​ ​also​ ​saw​ ​a​ ​reimagining​ ​of​ ​Jewish 
cultural​ ​life.​ ​A​ ​newly​ ​monied​ ​generation​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​built​ ​Jewish​ ​community​ ​centers​ ​and 
schools,​ ​where​ ​enrollment​ ​more​ ​than​ ​doubled​ ​between​ ​1945​ ​and​ ​1955.​ ​Synagogue​ ​affiliation, 
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especially​ ​in​ ​Reform​ ​and​ ​Conservative​ ​synagogues,​ ​saw​ ​a​ ​40%​ ​increase​ ​between​ ​1930​ ​and​ ​1960, 
reflecting​ ​both​ ​a​ ​post-Holocaust​ ​anxiety​ ​over​ ​loss​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​religion​ ​and​ ​culture​ ​and​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​away 
from​ ​urban​ ​secularism​ ​towards​ ​religiously​ ​affiliated​ ​suburb​ ​culture.   25
Perhaps​ ​the​ ​most​ ​visible​ ​hallmark​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​assimilation​ ​is​ ​the​ ​community’s 
unbridled​ ​success​ ​across​ ​professional​ ​fields​ ​within​ ​the​ ​span​ ​of​ ​a​ ​few​ ​decades.​ ​Prior​ ​to​ ​World 
War​ ​I,​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​were​ ​largely​ ​a​ ​lower-class,​ ​new​ ​immigrant​ ​minority​ ​group​ ​barred​ ​from 
most​ ​fields​ ​beyond​ ​manual​ ​labor.​ ​80%​ ​of​ ​all​ ​employed​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​were​ ​factory​ ​workers​ ​in 
the​ ​early​ ​20th​ ​century.​ ​Today,​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​consistently​ ​rank​ ​as​ ​the​ ​wealthiest​ ​or​ ​second 
wealthiest​ ​ethnic​ ​group​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​average​ ​annual​ ​salary,​ ​and​ ​have​ ​enjoyed​ ​this 
position​ ​for​ ​the​ ​last​ ​forty​ ​years.​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​are​ ​highly​ ​concentrated​ ​in​ ​fields​ ​considered 
prestigious​ ​in​ ​American​ ​culture,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​academic,​ ​law,​ ​and​ ​medicine,​ ​and​ ​earn​ ​around​ ​double 
the​ ​average​ ​per​ ​capita​ ​income​ ​of​ ​the​ ​average​ ​non-Jewish​ ​American.   26
B.​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​Political​ ​History 
I. Organizing​ ​History 
While​ ​early​ ​Sephardic​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​were​ ​actively​ ​involved​ ​in​ ​colonial​ ​politics, 
later​ ​immigrants​ ​struggled​ ​to​ ​find​ ​a​ ​political​ ​niche​ ​in​ ​a​ ​crowded​ ​Democratic​ ​Party.​ ​As​ ​floods​ ​of 
German​ ​and​ ​later​ ​Eastern​ ​European​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​arrived​ ​during​ ​the​ ​mid-19th​ ​and​ ​early 
20th​ ​centuries,​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​initially​ ​struggled​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​a​ ​political​ ​foothold.​ ​New​ ​York​ ​City 
became​ ​the​ ​site​ ​of​ ​most​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​activity​ ​during​ ​this​ ​time​ ​period.​ ​While​ ​more 
established​ ​uptown​ ​German​ ​Jewish​ ​communities​ ​could​ ​sometimes​ ​sway​ ​political​ ​actors,​ ​the 
swaths​ ​of​ ​newer​ ​Eastern​ ​European​ ​immigrants​ ​clashed​ ​with​ ​their​ ​downtown​ ​Irish​ ​and​ ​German 
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26 ​ ​Diner​ ​90 
14 
Catholic​ ​neighbors.​ ​Irish​ ​Catholics​ ​largely​ ​controlled​ ​the​ ​Democratic​ ​Party​ ​in​ ​the​ ​early​ ​20th 
century,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​New​ ​York,​ ​and​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​initially​ ​struggled​ ​to​ ​organize​ ​politically 
with​ ​them.​ ​A​ ​turning​ ​point​ ​came​ ​for​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​politics​ ​when​ ​Eastern​ ​European​ ​Jews 
leveraged​ ​their​ ​heavy​ ​concentration​ ​in​ ​the​ ​garment​ ​industry​ ​into​ ​union​ ​organizing.​ ​They​ ​had 
grown​ ​into​ ​a​ ​powerful​ ​political​ ​force​ ​by​ ​the​ ​1930s,​ ​and​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​influence 
began​ ​to​ ​spread​ ​to​ ​other​ ​communities​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​country.​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​were​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the 
New​ ​Deal​ ​Coalition​ ​and​ ​were​ ​strong​ ​supporters​ ​of​ ​social​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​justice​ ​programs​ ​of​ ​the 
early​ ​and​ ​mid-20th​ ​century. ​ ​Jews​ ​formed​ ​allegiances​ ​with​ ​other​ ​maligned​ ​immigrant​ ​and​ ​ethnic 27
groups​ ​and​ ​often​ ​organized​ ​along​ ​shared​ ​experiences​ ​of​ ​class​ ​and/or​ ​ethnic​ ​marginalization.​ ​By 
mid-century,​ ​however,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​post-war​ ​shift​ ​from​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​communities​ ​from​ ​cities​ ​to 
suburbs,​ ​greater​ ​acceptance​ ​from​ ​American​ ​institutions,​ ​rise​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Black​ ​Panther​ ​movement​ ​in 
the​ ​mid-1960s ,​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​began​ ​to​ ​see​ ​themselves​ ​as​ ​more​ ​aligned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​American 28
mainstream.​ ​This​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​mindset​ ​allowed​ ​more​ ​Jews​ ​to​ ​enter​ ​conservative​ ​politics;​ ​however​ ​the 
overwhelming​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​remain​ ​solidly​ ​Democratic​ ​and​ ​strongly​ ​identify​ ​as 
Jewish,​ ​despite​ ​assimilation.   29
II.​ ​Ideological​ ​Roots 
The​ ​first​ ​wave​ ​of​ ​Ashkenazic​ ​immigrants​ ​from​ ​Germany​ ​tended​ ​to​ ​view​ ​themselves​ ​as 
politically​ ​conservative,​ ​but​ ​subsequent​ ​waves​ ​of​ ​Eastern​ ​European​ ​immigrants​ ​were​ ​staunchly 
left-wing.​ ​Eastern​ ​European​ ​Jewish​ ​immigrants​ ​came​ ​from​ ​socialist​ ​and​ ​Bundist​ ​labor 
27 ​ ​Safran​ ​70 
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Panther​ ​movement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​mid-1960s​ ​caused​ ​a​ ​schism​ ​between​ ​African​ ​American​ ​organizers​ ​and 
Jewish​ ​organizers,​ ​who​ ​had​ ​formally​ ​allied​ ​on​ ​many​ ​political​ ​issues.​ ​Both​ ​groups​ ​remained​ ​(and 
still​ ​remain)​ ​solidly​ ​Democratic,​ ​however. 
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movements​ ​in​ ​Europe,​ ​and​ ​their​ ​experiences​ ​motivated​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​emphasis 
on​ ​union​ ​organizing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​early​ ​20th​ ​century.​ ​With​ ​the​ ​dawn​ ​of​ ​the​ ​New​ ​Deal​ ​after​ ​the​ ​Great 
Depression,​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​leaders​ ​joined​ ​the​ ​ranks​ ​of​ ​Democratic​ ​Party​ ​leadership, 
bringing​ ​with​ ​them​ ​socialist-influenced​ ​political​ ​ideology.​ ​The​ ​political​ ​success​ ​of​ ​Eastern 
European​ ​Jewish​ ​labor​ ​leaders​ ​has​ ​strongly​ ​influenced​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​politics. ​ ​Prior​ ​to​ ​their 30
success,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​second​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​19th​ ​century,​ ​America​ ​Jews​ ​tended​ ​to​ ​vote​ ​Republican.​ ​After 
the​ ​election​ ​of​ ​Democrat​ ​Woodrow​ ​Wilson​ ​in​ ​1916,​ ​however,​ ​in​ ​which​ ​55%​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​cast 
votes​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Democratic​ ​candidate,​ ​the​ ​majority​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​voted​ ​Democratic.​ ​90%​ ​of 
American​ ​Jews​ ​voted​ ​for​ ​Franklin​ ​D.​ ​Roosevelt​ ​in​ ​1940​ ​and​ ​1944,​ ​and​ ​75%​ ​voted​ ​for​ ​Harry 
Truman​ ​(15%​ ​split​ ​to​ ​support​ ​the​ ​Progressive​ ​Party).​ ​The​ ​block​ ​voting​ ​patterns​ ​of​ ​American 
Jews​ ​captured​ ​Democratic​ ​and​ ​Republican​ ​attention​ ​alike​ ​after​ ​1944,​ ​and​ ​both​ ​parties​ ​made 
subsequent​ ​plays​ ​for​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​vote​ ​by​ ​including​ ​Zionism​ ​in​ ​their​ ​platforms.​ ​The 
inclusion​ ​of​ ​Zionism​ ​in​ ​both​ ​party​ ​platforms​ ​seemed​ ​to​ ​have​ ​little​ ​effect​ ​on​ ​Jewish​ ​voting 
patterns,​ ​however,​ ​with​ ​90%​ ​of​ ​Jews​ ​casting​ ​ballots​ ​for​ ​non-Republicans​ ​in​ ​1948.​ ​Every 
Democratic​ ​presidential​ ​candidate​ ​has​ ​enjoyed​ ​at​ ​least​ ​67%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​vote​ ​since​ ​the,​ ​except 
for​ ​Jimmy​ ​Carter,​ ​who​ ​won​ ​45%​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​vote​ ​in​ ​1945.  31
78%​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​cast​ ​ballots​ ​for​ ​Democrat​ ​Barack​ ​Obama​ ​in​ ​2008.​ ​Obama​ ​earned 
a​ ​greater​ ​percentage​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​vote​ ​than​ ​of​ ​white​ ​Protestants,​ ​white​ ​Catholics,​ ​and​ ​voters 
stating​ ​no​ ​religion.​ ​Many​ ​commentators​ ​have​ ​wondered​ ​what​ ​explains​ ​American​ ​Jews’ 
unyielding​ ​support​ ​for​ ​Democratic​ ​candidates​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​century,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​community’s 
newfound​ ​economic​ ​success.​ ​While​ ​other​ ​immigrant​ ​groups,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​Hispanic​ ​Americans​ ​and 
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Arab​ ​Americans,​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​become​ ​more​ ​politically​ ​conservative​ ​as​ ​they​ ​become​ ​more​ ​prosperous, 
American​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​remained​ ​majority​ ​Democratic​ ​voters​ ​since​ ​World​ ​War​ ​I.   32
C.​ ​Zionism,​ ​American​ ​Jews,​ ​and​ ​Assimilation 
Louis​ ​Brandeis​ ​and​ ​other​ ​leaders​ ​brought​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​project​ ​to​ ​the​ ​US.​ ​​Zionism​ ​was​ ​a 
contentious​ ​and​ ​even​ ​unpopular​ ​movement​ ​among​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Holocaust,​ ​when 
many​ ​rejected​ ​it​ ​as​ ​unnecessary​ ​and​ ​even​ ​radical.​ ​After​ ​the​ ​Holocaust,​ ​however,​ ​American​ ​JEws 
largely​ ​converted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Zionist​ ​movement.​ ​The​ ​founding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​in​ ​1948​ ​and 
subsequent​ ​American​ ​media​ ​frenzy​ ​brought​ ​Israel​ ​to​ ​the​ ​forefront​ ​of​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
political​ ​consciousness,​ ​where​ ​it​ ​remains​ ​today.  33
The​ ​Six-Day​ ​War​ ​was​ ​a​ ​turning​ ​point​ ​in​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Zionist​ ​movement.​ ​Some 
American​ ​Jews​ ​disagreed​ ​with​ ​Israel’s​ ​response,​ ​which​ ​they​ ​decried​ ​as​ ​too​ ​anti-Palestinian​ ​and 
even​ ​too​ ​anti-Soviet.​ ​However,​ ​eventually​ ​the​ ​majority​ ​Jewish​ ​opinion​ ​-​ ​that​ ​the​ ​war​ ​had​ ​been 
necessary​ ​-​ ​won​ ​out,​ ​signifying​ ​the​ ​dawning​ ​of​ ​an​ ​era​ ​of​ ​relatively​ ​unanimous​ ​support​ ​for​ ​Israel 
among​ ​American​ ​Jews. ​ ​There​ ​were​ ​similar​ ​almost-schisms​ ​around​ ​the​ ​election​ ​of​ ​Menachem 34
Begin,​ ​the​ ​1982​ ​Lebanon​ ​War,​ ​the​ ​Oslo​ ​Accords,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​continuing​ ​occupation​ ​of​ ​Gaza​ ​and​ ​the 
West​ ​Bank.   35
During​ ​the​ ​1990s,​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​began​ ​to​ ​lobby​ ​separately​ ​for​ ​their​ ​increasingly 
disparate​ ​positions​ ​on​ ​Israel. ​ ​Americans​ ​for​ ​Peace​ ​Now​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Israel​ ​Policy​ ​Forum​ ​were​ ​the 36
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“left”​ ​Jewish​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Oslo​ ​Accords.​ ​ ​ ​The​ ​Zionist​ ​Organization​ ​of​ ​America​ ​and 37
Americans​ ​for​ ​a​ ​Safe​ ​Israel​ ​were​ ​the​ ​“right”​ ​Jewish​ ​response.  
V.​ ​Model​ ​and​ ​Data 
I​ ​collected​ ​data​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions 
between​ ​2007​ ​and​ ​2017.​ ​I​ ​focused​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions​ ​regarding 
Palestinians​ ​in​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Palestinian​ ​territories,​ ​and​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government 
actions​ ​regarding​ ​issues​ ​of​ ​social​ ​inequality​ ​and/or​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​I​ ​chose​ ​these​ ​focuses​ ​because 
of​ ​their​ ​feasibility​ ​given​ ​the​ ​available​ ​data.  
I​ ​observed​ ​the​ ​following​ ​trends: 
1. There​ ​are​ ​few​ ​instances​ ​of​ ​consensus​ ​within​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​community.​ ​Instead,​ ​I 
observed​ ​that​ ​most​ ​issues​ ​produced​ ​two​ ​or​ ​more​ ​competing​ ​perspectives​ ​that​ ​were​ ​able​ ​to 
receive​ ​popular​ ​support.  38
2. Perspectives​ ​tended​ ​to​ ​fall​ ​along​ ​American​ ​political​ ​ideological​ ​lines.​ ​Most​ ​issues 
produced​ ​between​ ​two​ ​and​ ​four​ ​general​ ​responses,​ ​and​ ​responses​ ​tended​ ​to​ ​derive​ ​from 
American​ ​“left”​ ​or​ ​“center/far-left”​ ​ideology,​ ​American​ ​“centrist”​ ​or​ ​“moderate” 
ideology,​ ​and​ ​American​ ​“right”​ ​or​ ​“center/far-right”​ ​ideology. 
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In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspective​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and 
government​ ​actions​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​decade​ ​are​ ​changing,​ ​we​ ​must​ ​first​ ​locate​ ​and​ ​organize 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​over​ ​that​ ​time​ ​period.​ ​To​ ​achieve​ ​this​ ​goal,​ ​I​ ​developed​ ​a​ ​linear 
“spectrum”​ ​model​ ​of​ ​political​ ​opinion.​ ​The​ ​political​ ​spectrum​ ​model​ ​is​ ​frequently​ ​utilized​ ​by 
Western​ ​political​ ​scientists,​ ​and​ ​consists​ ​of​ ​one​ ​or​ ​more​ ​axes​ ​used​ ​to​ ​depict​ ​separate​ ​political 
dimensions.​ ​The​ ​model​ ​typically​ ​contains​ ​a​ ​left​ ​wing​ ​and​ ​a​ ​right​ ​wing,​ ​wherein​ ​communist​ ​and 
socialist​ ​positions​ ​are​ ​internationally​ ​considered​ ​left,​ ​and​ ​capitalist​ ​and​ ​conservative​ ​positions​ ​are 
internationally​ ​considered​ ​right.​ ​American​ ​political​ ​spectra​ ​typically​ ​place​ ​social​ ​liberalism​ ​and 
the​ ​positions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Democratic​ ​Party​ ​on​ ​the​ ​left​ ​wing​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​American 
“Left,”​ ​even​ ​though​ ​in​ ​many​ ​countries,​ ​these​ ​positions​ ​would​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​“Right.”   39
This​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​this​ ​spectrum​ ​model​ ​is​ ​to​ ​locate​ ​and​ ​organize​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives,​ ​not​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​these​ ​perspectives​ ​exist​ ​or​ ​where​ ​they​ ​come​ ​from.​ ​Section​ ​IV 
offers​ ​context​ ​to​ ​help​ ​the​ ​reader​ ​understand​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​engagement 
with​ ​Israel,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​provide​ ​some​ ​additional​ ​information​ ​in​ ​this​ ​section​ ​to​ ​justify​ ​my​ ​placement​ ​of 
different​ ​perspectives​ ​in​ ​different​ ​​ ​camps.​ ​Camps​ ​in​ ​this​ ​model​ ​do​ ​not​ ​symbolize​ ​political​ ​parties 
or​ ​organizations​ ​that​ ​shape​ ​and​ ​produce​ ​political​ ​perspectives.​ ​​ ​Rather,​ ​camps​ ​should​ ​be 
understood​ ​as​ ​political​ ​locations:​ ​groups​ ​of​ ​ideologically​ ​related​ ​perspectives​ ​held​ ​by​ ​American 
Jewish​ ​individuals.​ ​Individuals,​ ​or​ ​camp​ ​members,​ ​“belong”​ ​to​ ​camps​ ​because​ ​their​ ​perspectives 
on​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of​ ​related​ ​issues​ ​align​ ​with​ ​those​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​camp.  
One​ ​limitation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​single-axis​ ​spectrum​ ​model​ ​is​ ​its​ ​inability​ ​to​ ​capture​ ​the​ ​variation​ ​of 
political​ ​views​ ​across​ ​multiple​ ​issues.​ ​My​ ​framework​ ​posits​ ​for​ ​two​ ​spectra​ ​models:​ ​one 
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spectrum​ ​model​ ​with​ ​left,​ ​right,​ ​and​ ​center​ ​camps​ ​for​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions​ ​relating​ ​to 
Palestinians,​ ​and​ ​a​ ​second​ ​spectrum​ ​model​ ​with​ ​left,​ ​right,​ ​and​ ​center​ ​camps​ ​for​ ​policies​ ​and 
government​ ​actions​ ​relating​ ​to​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​This​ ​framework​ ​allows​ ​for​ ​the 
possibility​ ​that​ ​an​ ​individual​ ​may​ ​have​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​different​ ​issues​ ​located​ ​in​ ​different 
camps.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​an​ ​individual’s​ ​perspectives​ ​could​ ​fall​ ​into​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​on​ ​the​ ​social 
equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​spectrum​ ​and​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​on​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​on​ ​Palestinians.  
B.​ ​Characterizing​ ​the​ ​Camps:​ ​Left,​ ​Right,​ ​and​ ​Center 
In​ ​developing​ ​a​ ​political​ ​spectrum​ ​to​ ​understand​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli 
policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions,​ ​I​ ​organized​ ​groups​ ​of​ ​ideologically​ ​similar​ ​perspectives​ ​into 
three​ ​broad​ ​camps.​ ​I​ ​grouped​ ​perspectives​ ​not​ ​only​ ​according​ ​to​ ​their​ ​similarities,​ ​but​ ​also 
according​ ​to​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​who​ ​hold​ ​these​ ​views​ ​articulated​ ​them 
ideologically.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​I​ ​observed​ ​that​ ​there​ ​exists​ ​a​ ​group​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​who​ ​share​ ​the 
position​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​government​ ​should​ ​end​ ​settlement​ ​expansion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​West​ ​Bank. 
American​ ​Jews​ ​who​ ​hold​ ​this​ ​view​ ​may​ ​differ​ ​on​ ​details​ ​and​ ​logistics,​ ​but​ ​they​ ​are​ ​united​ ​by 
their​ ​shared​ ​belief​ ​that​ ​the​ ​government​ ​should​ ​end​ ​settlement​ ​expansion.​ ​Most​ ​American​ ​Jews 
who​ ​hold​ ​this​ ​view​ ​will​ ​articulate​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​a​ ​“left”​ ​position,​ ​a​ ​position​ ​they​ ​hold​ ​because​ ​of​ ​their 
broader​ ​ideology,​ ​which​ ​they​ ​locate​ ​as​ ​on​ ​the​ ​left​ ​on​ ​the​ ​American​ ​political​ ​spectrum​ ​and​ ​our 
“American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel”​ ​spectrum.  
The​ ​terms​ ​most​ ​broadly​ ​used​ ​by​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​these​ ​position​ ​camps​ ​are 
“left,”​ ​“right,”​ ​and​ ​“center.”​ ​I​ ​will​ ​characterize​ ​each​ ​camp​ ​below. 
1. “Left”​ ​camp 
20 
a. On​ ​Palestinians:​ ​The​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​is​ ​characterized​ ​by​ ​its​ ​members’​ ​criticisms 
of​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​government’s​ ​treatment​ ​of​ ​Palestinians​ ​and​ ​by​ ​its​ ​members’ 
shared​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​Palestinian​ ​legal​ ​equality. ​ ​Some​ ​members​ ​of 40
this​ ​camp​ ​disagree​ ​on​ ​strategies​ ​to​ ​achieve​ ​this​ ​goal,​ ​but​ ​most​ ​members​ ​of 
this​ ​camp​ ​oppose​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​severely​ ​restrict​ ​Palestinian​ ​within​ ​the 
occupied​ ​territories,​ ​oppose​ ​what​ ​they​ ​perceive​ ​as​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​government’s 
failure​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​vital​ ​resources​ ​to​ ​vulnerable​ ​segments​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Palestinian 
population,​ ​and​ ​oppose​ ​settlement​ ​expansion​ ​into​ ​the​ ​West​ ​Bank. ​ ​Some 41
members​ ​of​ ​this​ ​camp​ ​fall​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​far​ ​left,​ ​supporting​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of 
Palestinian​ ​refugees​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​their​ ​ancestral​ ​homes​ ​in​ ​parts​ ​of​ ​Israel,​ ​the 
boycott,​ ​divestment,​ ​and​ ​sanctions​ ​movement,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​a 
bi-national​ ​Palestinian-Israeli​ ​state​ ​as​ ​an​ ​ultimate​ ​solution​ ​to​ ​the​ ​conflict.  42
Other​ ​members​ ​fall​ ​closer​ ​to​ ​the​ ​center​ ​on​ ​the​ ​spectrum,​ ​arguing​ ​that 
Israel​ ​should​ ​maintain​ ​its​ ​Jewish​ ​majority​ ​and​ ​character,​ ​but​ ​that 
Palestinians​ ​should​ ​be​ ​able​ ​to​ ​establish​ ​a​ ​separate,​ ​independent​ ​state​ ​in​ ​the 
occupied​ ​territories.   43
b. On​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity:​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​favor 
policies​ ​that​ ​promote​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​oppose​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​they​ ​perceive 
as​ ​discriminatory​ ​towards​ ​women,​ ​LGBTQ​ ​people,​ ​and/or​ ​racial​ ​and 
ethnic​ ​minorities​ ​within​ ​Israel.​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​this​ ​camp​ ​favor​ ​policies​ ​that 
40 ​ ​N,​ ​B,​ ​T,​ ​YU 
41 ​ ​Br 
42 ​ ​Br/Yt 
43 ​ ​Pew​ ​2013 
21 
allow​ ​for​ ​greater​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​in​ ​religious​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​reflect 
their​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​This​ ​camp’s​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish 
identity​ ​allows​ ​people​ ​who​ ​have​ ​converted​ ​to​ ​Judaism​ ​and​ ​people​ ​both 
who​ ​have​ ​at​ ​least​ ​one​ ​Jewish​ ​parent​ ​and​ ​also​ ​claim​ ​Judaism​ ​as​ ​their 
religion​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​Jewish​ ​and​ ​granted​ ​all​ ​rights​ ​afforded​ ​to​ ​Jews​ ​in 
Israel.​ ​​ ​This​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​also​ ​holds​ ​that​ ​all​ ​Jews​ ​have 
equal​ ​rights​ ​within​ ​religious​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​would​ ​favor​ ​the​ ​ordination​ ​of​ ​women 
rabbis,​ ​for​ ​example.   44
2. “Center”​ ​camp 
a. On​ ​Palestinians:​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​support​ ​controversial 
anti-terrorism​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​increase​ ​surveillance​ ​of​ ​Palestinian 
communities,​ ​restrict​ ​Palestinian​ ​movement,​ ​and​ ​sometimes​ ​result​ ​in 
resource​ ​shortages​ ​in​ ​the​ ​territories. ​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​this​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to 45
oppose​ ​settlement​ ​expansion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​territories. ​ ​They​ ​also​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​deny​ ​the 46
right​ ​of​ ​Palestinian​ ​refugees​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​parts​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​they​ ​oppose​ ​the 
boycott,​ ​divestment,​ ​and​ ​sanctions​ ​movement.​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​this​ ​camp​ ​tend 
to​ ​support​ ​the​ ​establishment​ ​of​ ​a​ ​separate​ ​Palestinian​ ​state​ ​in​ ​the​ ​occupied 
territories​ ​as​ ​an​ ​ultimate​ ​solution​ ​to​ ​the​ ​conflict.  47
b. Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​be​ ​interested​ ​in​ ​finding​ ​compromises 
between​ ​left​ ​and​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​policies.​ ​For 
44 ​ ​Pew​ ​2016 
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example,​ ​while​ ​some​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​members​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​homosexuality 
should​ ​be​ ​illegal​ ​in​ ​Israel,​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​support 
keeping​ ​homosexuality​ ​legal,​ ​but​ ​have​ ​opposed​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​would​ ​grant 
gay​ ​couples​ ​legal​ ​protections​ ​afforded​ ​to​ ​heterosexual​ ​couples,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the 
right​ ​to​ ​adopt​ ​children.​ ​They​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​share​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​members’ 
interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.  48
c. On​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity:​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​are 
very​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​on​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish 
identity.​ ​They​ ​also​ ​favor​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​promote​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​oppose 
policies​ ​that​ ​they​ ​perceive​ ​as​ ​discriminatory​ ​towards​ ​women,​ ​LGBTQ 
people,​ ​and/or​ ​racial​ ​and​ ​ethnic​ ​minorities​ ​within​ ​Israel. ​ ​Like​ ​the​ ​left 49
camp,​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​favor​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​greater 
social​ ​equality​ ​in​ ​religious​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​policies​ ​that​ ​reflect​ ​their​ ​interpretation 
of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​This​ ​camp’s​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​is​ ​the 
same​ ​as​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp’s;​ ​it​ ​allows​ ​people​ ​who​ ​have​ ​converted​ ​to​ ​Judaism 
and​ ​people​ ​both​ ​who​ ​have​ ​at​ ​least​ ​one​ ​Jewish​ ​parent​ ​and​ ​also​ ​claim 
Judaism​ ​as​ ​their​ ​religion​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​Jewish​ ​and​ ​granted​ ​all​ ​rights 
afforded​ ​to​ ​Jews​ ​in​ ​Israel.​ ​​ ​This​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​also​ ​holds 
that​ ​all​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​equal​ ​rights​ ​within​ ​religious​ ​life.   50
3. “Right”​ ​camp 
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a. Note:​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​derive​ ​from​ ​two​ ​distinct​ ​groups 
that​ ​share​ ​common​ ​policy​ ​goals.​ ​These​ ​groups​ ​are​ ​politically​ ​right-wing 
Jews,​ ​whose​ ​motivation​ ​to​ ​support​ ​conservative​ ​policies​ ​stems​ ​primarily 
from​ ​practical​ ​concern​ ​for​ ​Israel’s​ ​national​ ​security​ ​and​ ​is​ ​not​ ​explicitly 
religiously​ ​motivated,​ ​and​ ​religiously​ ​right-wing​ ​Jews,​ ​whose​ ​motivation 
to​ ​support​ ​conservative​ ​policies​ ​stems​ ​primarily​ ​from​ ​their​ ​shared​ ​belief 
that​ ​the​ ​land​ ​of​ ​Israel​ ​was​ ​bestowed​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​people​ ​by​ ​God,​ ​and​ ​that 
Jewish​ ​people​ ​have​ ​a​ ​religious​ ​duty​ ​to​ ​defend​ ​it​ ​from​ ​non-Jews.​ ​Religious 
right-wing​ ​Jews​ ​often​ ​articulate​ ​their​ ​policy​ ​concerns​ ​as​ ​national​ ​security 
concerns,​ ​but​ ​their​ ​motivation​ ​is​ ​distinct​ ​from​ ​right-wing​ ​Jews​ ​who​ ​are​ ​not 
primarily​ ​motivated​ ​by​ ​their​ ​belief​ ​in​ ​religious​ ​Zionism.  51
b. On​ ​Palestinians:​ ​Members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​favor​ ​policies​ ​that 
increase​ ​surveillance​ ​of​ ​Palestinian​ ​communities,​ ​increase​ ​Israeli​ ​military 
presence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​West​ ​Bank​ ​and​ ​Gaza,​ ​and​ ​restrict​ ​Palestinian​ ​mobility.  52
They​ ​deny​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of​ ​Palestinian​ ​refugees​ ​to​ ​return​ ​to​ ​parts​ ​of​ ​Israel,​ ​and 
they​ ​oppose​ ​the​ ​boycott,​ ​divestment,​ ​and​ ​sanctions​ ​movement.​ ​Members 
of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​support​ ​continued​ ​settlement​ ​expansion.   53
c. On​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity:​ ​Some​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp 
who​ ​are​ ​not​ ​motivated​ ​by​ ​religious​ ​Zionism​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​support​ ​some​ ​policies 
aimed​ ​at​ ​increasing​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​within​ ​Israel.​ ​Some​ ​of​ ​these​ ​members 
are​ ​increasingly​ ​supportive​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​women,​ ​LGBTQ 
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people,​ ​and​ ​racial​ ​and​ ​ethnic​ ​minorities​ ​in​ ​Israel.​ ​Members​ ​who​ ​support 
social​ ​equality​ ​in​ ​public​ ​life​ ​also​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​support​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​within 
religious​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​they​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​share​ ​the​ ​left​ ​and​ ​center​ ​camps’ 
interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity. ​ ​However,​ ​other​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​right 54
camp​ ​who​ ​are​ ​not​ ​religiously​ ​motivated​ ​do​ ​not​ ​support​ ​policies​ ​aimed 
social​ ​equality​ ​within​ ​Israel.​ ​Similarly,​ ​most​ ​religious​ ​Zionist​ ​members​ ​of 
the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​fiercely​ ​oppose​ ​most​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​policies.​ ​Sometimes, 
this​ ​opposition​ ​is​ ​justified​ ​as​ ​adherence​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​religious​ ​law.​ ​They​ ​tend 
to​ ​oppose​ ​measures​ ​aimed​ ​at​ ​increasing​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​within​ ​religious 
life​ ​as​ ​well,​ ​usually​ ​citing​ ​adherence​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​religious​ ​law. ​ ​Members 55
of​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​who​ ​oppose​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​measures​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​favor​ ​an 
Orthodox​ ​interpretation​ ​of​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​Orthodox​ ​interpretations​ ​of 
Jewish​ ​identity​ ​allow​ ​people​ ​born​ ​to​ ​Jewish​ ​mothers​ ​and​ ​people​ ​who 
convert​ ​to​ ​Judaism​ ​under​ ​an​ ​Orthodox​ ​rabbi​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​Jewish.​ ​This 
interpretation​ ​tends​ ​to​ ​favor​ ​social​ ​inequality​ ​in​ ​religious​ ​life,​ ​and​ ​would 
oppose​ ​women​ ​rabbis,​ ​for​ ​example.   56
VI.​ ​Hypothesis​ ​Generation 
A. Splitting​ ​the​ ​Center:​ ​Hypotheses  
I​ ​have​ ​provided​ ​historical​ ​context​ ​to​ ​help​ ​the​ ​reader​ ​understand​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​government​ ​actions,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​have​ ​used​ ​spectra​ ​models​ ​to​ ​map 
data​ ​on​ ​those​ ​perspectives​ ​into​ ​three​ ​camps:​ ​the​ ​left,​ ​the​ ​center,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​right.​ ​I​ ​will​ ​now​ ​argue 
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that​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten​ ​years,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​observed​ ​movement​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​models.​ ​I​ ​propose​ ​the 
following​ ​hypotheses: 
1. Between​ ​2007​ ​and​ ​2017,​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​have​ ​shifted 
along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​models​ ​(outlined​ ​in​ ​Section​ ​V​ ​Part​ ​A).  
2. American​ ​Jews​ ​have​ ​tended​ ​to​ ​shift​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camps​ ​on​ ​both​ ​the 
spectra​ ​models.​ ​Some​ ​individuals​ ​have​ ​moved​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camps,​ ​and​ ​others 
have​ ​moved​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camps. 
3. Movement​ ​occurs​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​when​ ​we​ ​observe​ ​one​ ​or​ ​both​ ​of​ ​the 
following:  
a. Changes​ ​in​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​observance​ ​among​ ​American​ ​Jews 
b. The​ ​Israeli​ ​government​ ​issues​ ​policies​ ​or​ ​takes​ ​action​ ​on​ ​issues​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​or 
associated​ ​with​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​identity. 
B.​ ​Hypotheses​ ​Explained 
There​ ​are​ ​several​ ​reasons​ ​to​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​we​ ​observed​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten​ ​years.​ ​First,​ ​poll​ ​data​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​opinions​ ​on 
Israeli​ ​government​ ​action​ ​towards​ ​Palestinians​ ​indicates​ ​that​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​are​ ​becoming 
increasingly​ ​polarized​ ​on​ ​settlement​ ​expansion​ ​and​ ​restrictions​ ​of​ ​Palestinian​ ​movement. ​ ​Over 57
the​ ​last​ ​five​ ​years,​ ​some​ ​former​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​members​ ​have​ ​become​ ​so​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​settlement 
expansion​ ​and​ ​checkpoints​ ​that​ ​they​ ​have​ ​shifted​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left 
camp​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Palestinians​ ​spectrum.​ ​Other​ ​former​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​members​ ​have​ ​either​ ​become 
pessimistic​ ​about​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​of​ ​a​ ​two-state​ ​solution,​ ​increasingly​ ​wary​ ​of​ ​terrorism,​ ​or​ ​both, 
and​ ​have​ ​adopted​ ​right-wing​ ​rhetoric​ ​on​ ​how​ ​settlement​ ​expansion​ ​and​ ​mobility​ ​restriction​ ​are 
57 ​ ​Pew​ ​2013 
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essential​ ​to​ ​Israeli​ ​national​ ​security. ​ ​Testimonials​ ​-​ ​editorials,​ ​news​ ​articles,​ ​and​ ​community 58
statements​ ​-​ ​reflect​ ​this​ ​shift​ ​as​ ​well.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​also​ ​observed​ ​an​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​American​ ​left​ ​camp 
and​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​activism​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten​ ​years,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​left​ ​advocating​ ​increasingly​ ​for​ ​an​ ​end 
to​ ​settlement​ ​expansion,​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​right​ ​advocating​ ​that​ ​Israel​ ​maintain​ ​or​ ​expand 
settlements.   59
We​ ​observe​ ​similar​ ​trends​ ​for​ ​the​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​spectrum.​ ​Poll​ ​data 
indicates​ ​some​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​more​ ​accepting​ ​of​ ​LGBTQ​ ​Jews​ ​and​ ​racial​ ​and​ ​ethnic​ ​minorities 
within​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​community​ ​than​ ​ever. ​ ​Many​ ​former​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​members​ ​have​ ​adopted 60
much​ ​stronger​ ​stances​ ​on​ ​policies​ ​for​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​in​ ​Israel​ ​such​ ​that​ ​their​ ​perspectives​ ​now 
align​ ​with​ ​those​ ​of​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp. ​ ​Even​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​members​ ​have​ ​shifted​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left​ ​on 61
some​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​issues. ​ ​We​ ​also​ ​observe​ ​an​ ​increased​ ​willingness​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​to 62
revoke​ ​political​ ​and​ ​financial​ ​support​ ​from​ ​Israel​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​perceived​ ​social​ ​inequality 
among​ ​Israeli​ ​Jews.   63
This​ ​phenomenon​ ​helps​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​third​ ​hypothesis,​ ​that​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives 
shift​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​changing​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​observance​ ​and​ ​Israeli​ ​government 
behavior.​ ​​ ​One​ ​of​ ​the​ ​most​ ​common​ ​explanations​ ​for​ ​changing​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on 
Israel​ ​historically​ ​is​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​assimilation.​ ​As​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​assimilate,​ ​most​ ​scholars 
argue,​ ​they​ ​will​ ​become​ ​more​ ​indifferent​ ​or​ ​hostile​ ​to​ ​Israel​ ​and​ ​their​ ​political​ ​perspectives​ ​will 
shift​ ​accordingly. ​ ​One​ ​way​ ​to​ ​measure​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​assimilation​ ​is​ ​by​ ​observing​ ​changes 64
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in​ ​levels​ ​of​ ​religious​ ​observance​ ​over​ ​time.​ ​Over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten​ ​years,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​observed​ ​growth​ ​in 
Modern​ ​Orthodox​ ​and​ ​Reform​ ​movements​ ​memberships​ ​and​ ​declining​ ​memberships​ ​in​ ​the 
Orthodox​ ​and​ ​Conservative​ ​movements.​ ​Most​ ​Reform​ ​Jews​ ​fall​ ​between​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp​ ​and​ ​the 
left​ ​camp​ ​or​ ​in​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​on​ ​both​ ​spectra.​ ​Orthodox​ ​Jews​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​fall​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​on 
both​ ​spectra.​ ​Conservative​ ​Jews​ ​are​ ​less​ ​consistent,​ ​with​ ​movement​ ​members​ ​belonging​ ​to​ ​all 
three​ ​camps,​ ​though​ ​tending​ ​to​ ​congregate​ ​on​ ​the​ ​left​ ​of​ ​the​ ​center​ ​camp.​ ​Modern​ ​Orthodox​ ​Jews 
tend​ ​to​ ​congregate​ ​on​ ​the​ ​right​ ​of​ ​center,​ ​with​ ​some​ ​members​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​camp​ ​and​ ​some​ ​in​ ​the 
center​ ​camp.​ ​These​ ​membership​ ​trends​ ​observed​ ​across​ ​Jewish​ ​movements​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​ten 
years​ ​provide​ ​support​ ​the​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​are​ ​shifting​ ​away​ ​from​ ​the 
center​ ​camps​ ​and​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left​ ​and​ ​right​ ​camps.  65
Finally,​ ​we​ ​observe​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​American​ ​political​ ​perspectives​ ​in​ ​response​ ​to​ ​the​ ​behavior 
of​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​government.​ ​When​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​government​ ​has​ ​taken​ ​stances​ ​on​ ​issues​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​or 
associated​ ​with​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​in-group​ ​identity,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​religious​ ​pluralism,​ ​we​ ​observe 
movement​ ​along​ ​both​ ​spectra. ​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​the​ ​government’s​ ​conservative​ ​stances​ ​on​ ​Jewish 66
religious​ ​pluralism​ ​and​ ​LGBTQ​ ​rights​ ​over​ ​the​ ​last​ ​two​ ​years​ ​have​ ​caused​ ​massive​ ​upheaval 
within​ ​the​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​community.​ ​Some​ ​commentators​ ​have​ ​argued​ ​that​ ​this​ ​pushback​ ​has 
sparked​ ​movement​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left​ ​and​ ​right​ ​camps​ ​on​ ​both​ ​the​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Palestinians 
spectra. ​ ​The​ ​ongoing​ ​occupation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​West​ ​Bank​ ​and​ ​Gaza​ ​is​ ​starting​ ​to​ ​spur​ ​more​ ​movement 67
along​ ​the​ ​Israel​ ​support​ ​spectrum.​ ​However,​ ​for​ ​now​ ​at​ ​least,​ ​issues​ ​of​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​seem​ ​much 
more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​spur​ ​movement​ ​than​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​on​ ​Palestinians.  68
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VII.​ ​​ ​Hypothesis​ ​Testing:​ ​Proposals​ ​for​ ​Other​ ​Researchers 
A. Proposed​ ​Research​ ​Methods 
Future​ ​researchers​ ​should​ ​empirically​ ​test​ ​this​ ​data​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​with​ ​greater​ ​certainty​ ​the 
validity​ ​of​ ​these​ ​claims.​ ​This​ ​section​ ​will​ ​outline​ ​methodology​ ​other​ ​researchers​ ​should​ ​use​ ​to 
test​ ​the​ ​hypotheses.  
I. Mapping​ ​Historical​ ​Data 
A. Researchers​ ​should​ ​conduct​ ​a​ ​thorough​ ​review​ ​of​ ​all​ ​available​ ​data​ ​on 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​towards​ ​Palestinians​ ​and 
Israeli​ ​policies​ ​on​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​2007.  
B. Researchers​ ​should​ ​use​ ​the​ ​models​ ​developed​ ​in​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​to​ ​map 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​historically,​ ​identify​ ​trends,​ ​and,​ ​critically, 
locate​ ​those​ ​perspectives​ ​in​ ​the​ ​ten-year​ ​period​ ​preceding​ ​our​ ​research 
focus,​ ​1997-2007.  
II. Survey 
A. Researchers​ ​should​ ​locate​ ​a​ ​large​ ​and​ ​diverse​ ​sample​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews. 
Ideally,​ ​a​ ​sample​ ​should​ ​contain​ ​about​ ​3,500​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​and​ ​should 
contain​ ​proportional​ ​numbers​ ​of​ ​secular​ ​and​ ​affiliated​ ​individuals.​ ​The 
sample​ ​should​ ​account​ ​for​ ​age,​ ​gender,​ ​and​ ​regional​ ​diversity​ ​within 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​communities.​ ​The​ ​survey​ ​will​ ​collect​ ​demographic 
information​ ​from​ ​individual​ ​respondents. 
B. Surveys​ ​should​ ​be​ ​conducted​ ​on​ ​landlines​ ​and​ ​cellphones. 
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C. Researchers​ ​should​ ​design​ ​and​ ​conduct​ ​a​ ​survey​ ​that​ ​will​ ​allow​ ​them​ ​to 
ascertain​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​either​ ​Israeli 
policies​ ​on​ ​Palestinians​ ​or​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​on​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish 
identity​ ​are​ ​changing.​ ​To​ ​achieve​ ​this​ ​end,​ ​the​ ​survey​ ​should​ ​first​ ​ask​ ​the 
respondent​ ​to​ ​self-identify​ ​politically​ ​and​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​their​ ​political 
activity​ ​and​ ​ideology.​ ​The​ ​survey​ ​should​ ​then​ ​identify​ ​several​ ​high-profile 
issues​ ​in​ ​Israeli​ ​politics​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​Palestinians​ ​and​ ​social​ ​equality/Jewish 
identity​ ​from​ ​at​ ​least​ ​2007​ ​or​ ​earlier.​ ​Researchers​ ​should​ ​ask​ ​respondents 
to​ ​recall​ ​their​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​these​ ​issues​ ​at​ ​the​ ​time​ ​at​ ​which​ ​they​ ​first 
became​ ​relevant;​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​during​ ​their​ ​first​ ​news​ ​cycle.​ ​Researchers 
should​ ​then​ ​choose​ ​several​ ​political​ ​events​ ​since​ ​2007​ ​regarding​ ​Israeli 
policies​ ​towards​ ​Palestinians​ ​and​ ​social​ ​equality/Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​For 
example,​ ​perhaps​ ​within​ ​several​ ​weeks​ ​of​ ​the​ ​survey’s​ ​circulation,​ ​Israel 
ruled​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​gay​ ​couples​ ​to​ ​legally​ ​adopt​ ​children​ ​and,​ ​separately,​ ​had 
passed​ ​measures​ ​to​ ​expand​ ​settlements​ ​in​ ​East​ ​Jerusalem.​ ​The​ ​survey 
should​ ​describe​ ​events​ ​such​ ​as​ ​these​ ​to​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​and​ ​ask​ ​for​ ​their 
reaction​ ​and​ ​what​ ​they​ ​believe​ ​should​ ​be​ ​done.​ ​Researchers​ ​should​ ​record 
all​ ​responses​ ​and,​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​completion​ ​of​ ​survey​ ​circulation,​ ​plot 
responses​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​models​ ​for​ ​each​ ​issue​ ​type​ ​and​ ​time​ ​period.​ ​It 
might​ ​make​ ​sense​ ​for​ ​researchers​ ​to​ ​use​ ​separate​ ​models​ ​not​ ​only​ ​for​ ​issue 
type,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​for​ ​issues​ ​before​ ​2007​ ​and​ ​after​ ​2007.  
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D. After​ ​plotting​ ​survey​ ​responses,​ ​researchers​ ​can​ ​observe​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not 
perspectives​ ​have​ ​moved​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​models.  
III. Events​ ​Data 
A. An​ ​events​ ​data​ ​catalog​ ​should​ ​be​ ​paired​ ​with​ ​a​ ​survey​ ​to​ ​determine 
whether​ ​certain​ ​political​ ​circumstances​ ​engender​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​public 
opinion​ ​trends.​ ​Researchers​ ​should​ ​use​ ​events​ ​data​ ​to​ ​categorize​ ​events 
and​ ​their​ ​responses​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​political 
events​ ​can​ ​account​ ​for​ ​movement​ ​along​ ​the​ ​spectra​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
political​ ​perspectives.​ ​To​ ​do​ ​this,​ ​a​ ​researcher​ ​would​ ​have​ ​to​ ​develop 
criteria​ ​to​ ​evaluate​ ​and​ ​catalog​ ​events​ ​before​ ​2007​ ​and​ ​after​ ​2007.​ ​One 
framework​ ​for​ ​this​ ​criteria​ ​could​ ​be​ ​developing​ ​working​ ​definitions​ ​of 
“conservative”​ ​events​ ​and​ ​“progressive”​ ​events​ ​and​ ​categorizing​ ​issues 
according​ ​to​ ​those​ ​definitions.  
B. Once​ ​a​ ​framework​ ​is​ ​in​ ​place,​ ​researchers​ ​can​ ​apply​ ​the​ ​framework​ ​to​ ​the 
events​ ​studied​ ​in​ ​the​ ​survey​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​a​ ​relationship 
exists​ ​between​ ​event​ ​type​ ​and​ ​response​ ​type.​ ​Researchers​ ​should​ ​study 
whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​patterns​ ​exist,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​an​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of 
“conservative”​ ​events​ ​and​ ​an​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​response​ ​type.​ ​An 
analysis​ ​of​ ​this​ ​data​ ​can​ ​help​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​political 
circumstances​ ​have​ ​a​ ​causal​ ​effect​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political 
perspectives.  
IV. Demographic​ ​Analysis 
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A. Researchers​ ​should​ ​apply​ ​a​ ​demographic​ ​analysis​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or 
not​ ​demographic​ ​changes​ ​among​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​people​ ​have​ ​caused 
changes​ ​in​ ​their​ ​political​ ​perspectives.​ ​Researchers​ ​can​ ​group​ ​responses​ ​by 
demographic​ ​information​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​patterns​ ​exist;​ ​for 
example,​ ​perhaps​ ​respondents​ ​under​ ​30​ ​were​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​hold 
perspectives​ ​aligned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​than​ ​their​ ​elders.​ ​Researchers​ ​can 
record​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​patterns​ ​exist​ ​along​ ​demographic​ ​lines​ ​and​ ​use 
sociological​ ​and​ ​political​ ​science​ ​analyses​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​the​ ​significance​ ​of 
those​ ​patterns.​ ​For​ ​example,​ ​a​ ​trend​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​left​ ​camp​ ​among​ ​younger 
Jews​ ​might​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​signify​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​broadly,​ ​since​ ​responses​ ​from​ ​younger​ ​Americans​ ​tend​ ​to 
favor​ ​progressive​ ​policies​ ​broadly​ ​and​ ​since​ ​Americans​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​move 
away​ ​from​ ​progressive​ ​policies​ ​towards​ ​moderate​ ​or​ ​conservative​ ​policies 
as​ ​they​ ​age.  
B. Researchers​ ​should​ ​conduct​ ​a​ ​literature​ ​review​ ​on​ ​arguments​ ​for 
assimilation​ ​as​ ​a​ ​causal​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​alleged​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​American 
Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel.​ ​Researchers​ ​should​ ​evaluate​ ​survey 
responses,​ ​grouped​ ​by​ ​demographics,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​these​ ​arguments​ ​to 
determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​assimilation​ ​and/or​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​demographics 
among​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​can​ ​explain​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel.  
V. Interviews 
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A. Researchers​ ​should​ ​conduct​ ​in-depth​ ​interviews​ ​with​ ​a​ ​large​ ​and​ ​diverse 
sample​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​better​ ​understand​ ​how​ ​their​ ​political 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​form​ ​and​ ​change.​ ​Interviewers​ ​should​ ​seek​ ​out 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​thought​ ​leaders,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​activists,​ ​religious​ ​and 
community​ ​shepherds,​ ​and​ ​commentators,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​community 
members.​ ​Interviewers​ ​should​ ​ask​ ​interviewees​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​their​ ​own 
political​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel,​ ​how​ ​they​ ​formed,​ ​and​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​they 
believe​ ​their​ ​perspectives​ ​have​ ​changed​ ​and​ ​why.​ ​Interviewers​ ​should​ ​also 
ask​ ​interviewees​ ​to​ ​describe​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​they​ ​believe​ ​perspectives​ ​have 
changed​ ​broadly​ ​across​ ​the​ ​community,​ ​​ ​and​ ​under​ ​what​ ​circumstances.  
B. Researchers​ ​should​ ​use​ ​interview​ ​data​ ​to​ ​supplement​ ​arguments​ ​made 
from​ ​survey​ ​data,​ ​demographic​ ​analyses,​ ​and​ ​events​ ​data. 
VIII.​ ​Conclusion 
A. Implications​ ​and​ ​Questions​ ​for​ ​Future​ ​Researchers 
This​ ​thesis​ ​has​ ​explored​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​political​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel.​ ​I​ ​have 
hypothesized​ ​that​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israeli​ ​policies​ ​towards​ ​Palestinians​ ​and 
Israeli​ ​policies​ ​on​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity​ ​are​ ​changing.​ ​I​ ​further​ ​hypothesized​ ​that 
American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​are​ ​becoming​ ​increasingly​ ​polarized,​ ​and​ ​that​ ​changes​ ​in 
Israeli​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​demographics​ ​may​ ​explain​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​American 
Jewish​ ​political​ ​perspectives.  
Due​ ​to​ ​constraints​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​resources,​ ​this​ ​thesis​ ​left​ ​many​ ​questions​ ​unanswered. 
Although​ ​I​ ​supported​ ​my​ ​hypotheses​ ​with​ ​available​ ​data​ ​and​ ​historical​ ​context,​ ​I​ ​could​ ​not 
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empirically​ ​test​ ​their​ ​validity.​ ​I​ ​encourage​ ​other​ ​researchers​ ​to​ ​use​ ​the​ ​methodology​ ​outlined​ ​in 
Section​ ​VII​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​my​ ​hypotheses.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​I​ ​did​ ​not​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​the​ ​only​ ​political 
opinion​ ​data​ ​collected​ ​on​ ​American​ ​Jews​ ​was​ ​on​ ​issues​ ​regarding​ ​Palestinians​ ​and​ ​issues 
regarding​ ​social​ ​equality​ ​and​ ​Jewish​ ​identity.​ ​I​ ​would​ ​encourage​ ​future​ ​researchers​ ​to​ ​try​ ​to 
explain​ ​why​ ​these​ ​issues,​ ​and​ ​not​ ​economic​ ​inequality,​ ​or​ ​environmental​ ​issues,​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​are 
particularly​ ​salient.​ ​Significantly,​ ​I​ ​also​ ​did​ ​not​ ​explain​ ​why​ ​or​ ​how​ ​American​ ​Jewish 
perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​are​ ​materially​ ​relevant.​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​Israel​ ​are 
certainly​ ​presumed​ ​by​ ​politicians,​ ​commentators,​ ​and​ ​Americans,​ ​Israelis,​ ​and​ ​Palestinians​ ​alike 
to​ ​have​ ​political​ ​significance​ ​in​ ​Israel.​ ​I​ ​would​ ​encourage​ ​future​ ​researchers​ ​to​ ​analyze​ ​the 
validity​ ​of​ ​this​ ​presumption.  
If​ ​these​ ​hypotheses​ ​are​ ​correct,​ ​we​ ​have​ ​a​ ​host​ ​of​ ​new​ ​questions​ ​to​ ​answer​ ​beyond​ ​the 
ones​ ​enumerated​ ​above.​ ​If​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​demographics​ ​have​ ​changed,​ ​what​ ​are​ ​the 
implications​ ​for​ ​American​ ​and​ ​Israeli​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​cultural​ ​life?​ ​If​ ​Israeli​ ​politics​ ​have​ ​changed, 
what​ ​are​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Israeli​ ​Palestinians​ ​conflict,​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​Israel​ ​and 
the​ ​Jewish​ ​Diaspora,​ ​and​ ​American​ ​involvement​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Middle​ ​East?​ ​Understanding​ ​the​ ​political 
psychology​ ​of​ ​American​ ​Jewish​ ​communities,​ ​and​ ​how​ ​it​ ​forms​ ​and​ ​shifts,​ ​can​ ​teach​ ​us 
something​ ​valuable​ ​about​ ​a​ ​number​ ​heavyweight​ ​political​ ​issues​ ​in​ ​the​ ​US​ ​and​ ​Israel​ ​alike.​ ​It 
seems​ ​that​ ​the​ ​views​ ​of​ ​Jews​ ​​hutz​ ​la’aertz​,​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​land,​ ​still​ ​hold​ ​weight​ ​on​ ​issues​ ​of​ ​Israel, 
sixty-nine​ ​years​ ​after​ ​the​ ​founding​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Jewish​ ​state.  
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